The McCain I Know

John McCain’s victory in the New Hampshire primary last January led, although not inevitably, to securing his party’s nomination two months later and the opportunity to square off against the richest and largest presidential campaign ever assembled. Our gifted opponent, and his talented and exceptionally disciplined staff, were enough of a challenge to contend with. But the environment we ran in, which grew worse the closer we got to Election Day, made a very difficult task close to impossible. Americans, tired of war and deeply anxious over a bad economy, were ready for change. The incumbent president‘s unpopularity, a historically high wrong track number, and the Republican Party’s squandered reputation for competent governance and fiscal discipline made Americans readily receptive to our eloquent opponent‘s message of change, and helped overcome their doubts about his inexperience and liberal record.

It seemed to us there were more investigative stories about our candidate’s spouse than about Senator Obama.

By the end of the campaign, our own polling revealed over 60 percent of voters recognized Senator Obama as a political liberal, while only a little over 20 percent of voters identified themselves that way. It didn’t matter. Americans wanted change, and a majority of them were willing to gamble on the young man with a short resume, whose positions on issues were often at odds with theirs, because he offered the most change. Any Republican, even one with a reputation for political courage and a record of challenging his party’s leadership, would have a hard time satisfying the public’s desire for sweeping change. The R after his name indicted him in the public mind, and Senator Obama’s campaign, with millions of dollars in advertising and an intense focus on its message, expertly prosecuted the case: McCain equals four more years of Bush.

The senator’s selection of Governor Palin, like almost every major decision in the campaign, was viewed as a cynical and self-interested choice intended to excite social conservatives, who hadn’t shown much enthusiasm for the top of the ticket. Surely, no one would have advised our candidate to choose a running mate who would have lengthened the odds against us. But overlooked in the brisk dismissal that Governor Palin might have qualities other than her social conservative credentials and obvious retail political skills was her actual appeal to John McCain. It also fails to credit his advisers’ conviction that, given the environment we were running in, a message of experience over the untested new guy would not succeed even if we executed perfectly. Arguing that John McCain actually had a record of risking his career to reform the institutions and practices of politics and our opponent didn’t had gotten us nowhere. To reporters and many voters, Senator Obama was change personified and John McCain was yesterday‘s news.

Every candidate for office who takes on an incumbent runs on a message of change and reform. Few live up to their promise. Sarah Palin ran against the political establishment in Alaska with the promise to clean up the self-dealing and corruption that had finally worn out the patience of Alaskan voters. She defeated an incumbent Republican governor and a popular former Democratic one, an impressive accomplishment in itself. But she didn’t just run as a reformer. She governed as one. That was the source of her appeal to John McCain. He holds in high esteem anyone of either party who keeps their campaign commitments to reform. He greatly admired Senator Russ Feingold and the late Senator Paul Wellstone for that reason, despite their liberal credentials and views on most issues. He chose Sarah Palin to underscore his commitment to reform and help him keep his promise once in office. He recognized she had little experience in foreign affairs, but so did his opponent. She was well-versed in the area of energy security, which would have been a priority of a McCain administration. She is hardworking, intelligent, and a quick study, and he believed she would learn by study and experience all she would be required to know as next in line to the presidency.

No doubt, we made our share of mistakes. In hindsight, the decision to briefly suspend our campaign to help find support for legislation to address the collapse of the global credit system is probably one of them. But the criticism that it was nothing but a stunt that failed is mistaken. The morning of the announcement, senior economic advisers to the campaign impressed on the candidate that failure to pass some rescue package would lead to a disaster of monumental proportions. We were also aware that support for the legislation among House Republicans was virtually nonexistent.

He and his senior staff believed he had three options. The most politically appealing was to remain quiet, and then weigh in against the legislation as it was put to a vote, which would have put him on the side of about 70 percent of voters. The second was to offer a vague appeal for improvements to the bill and then keep his distance, mindful that it would probably fail because of House Republican opposition. The third was to become personally involved in finding a compromise that could pass with Republican support and try to convince Senator Obama to join us. He chose the third course, and all his senior staff agreed with him. And while it turned out to be politically costly, I don’t think it was anything less than the responsible decision. Nor do I think it proved to be a fatal injury to his campaign. The financial crisis he was responding to had already very likely made the steep hill he was climbing insurmountable.

The people who worked loyally and as hard as they could to help elect him, whether they had been with John McCain for years or had worked on President Bush’s campaign, were all proud to do so because they respected the reputation he had risked so much to achieve, and took it as their personal responsibility to protect it. Rick Davis kept the campaign together long after most people had given up on it, and Steve Schmidt brought a new vitality and focus to it. They worked well and creatively together. Steve encouraged the candidate to campaign in places Republicans seldom visited and remained as vigilant about protecting the “McCain brand” as anyone. Rick Davis managed the typical disagreements that occur within campaigns so tactfully that they seldom became a serious cause for dissension. The senior staff made most decisions by consensus, after all arguments were fully debated. Our successes and our mistakes were a shared responsibility.