World War II's Team of Rivals

That is not to say that it does not have its drawbacks, but they are those of its conception. Perhaps because Roberts is British (so am I), he clearly likes and admires Brooke more than Marshall, and has more fun with Churchill than with FDR. And of course there is no doubt about it, Brooke, with his flaming temper, his impatience and his passion for bird-watching at moments of stress is a more engaging personality than the almost inhumanly remote Marshall, and Churchill is infinitely more human, lovable and infuriating than FDR, who made something of a fetish at hiding (or faking) his emotions. There is, therefore, whether conscious or not, a certain pro-British bias to the book, much of which comes from the fact that there is much more interesting material available on the British side, inevitably, because FDR never lived to write his memoirs.

The other problem—also derived from the ambitious conception of the book—is that it shows the war from the top, as it were, from the summit, and does not attempt to give the reader a description of what the decisions that were reached at this high altitude felt like to those who were doing the fighting (the one exception being the Dieppe raid). This is war from the Oval Office, 10 Downing Street, the Mena House Hotel in Cairo, and so on—policy, as opposed to fighting. Having said that, if you want to know why Operation Torch, the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa, took place, or why the capture of Sicily was followed by a bloody and indecisive battle of attrition with the Germans up the whole length of Italy, or why the Normandy invasion was such a political hot potato and a source of bad feelings between the Americans and the British right the way to the top, or how the differing British and American strategies for attacking Nazi Germany and finishing off the war became a highly charged inter-allied dispute, this is the book to read. I would go so far as to say that anybody who is interested in World War Two owes it to themselves to read this book—nothing like it exists, and without reading it, the actual history of the campaigns themselves will make no sense.

There are some extraordinary things in this book—the story of Lawrence Burgess’ secret notes of the British War Cabinet meetings is extraordinary (I do not propose to spoil it for the reader), and would make a whole book, as well as a potential novel, as is the story of how and why Field Marshal Sir William Robertson’s Soldiers and Statesmen, a very frank account of the quarrels between brass hats and bowler hats in World War One, became mandatory reading in Washington in 1942, much to Churchill’s dismay. As well, Roberts reinstates the importance of certain figures that have been allowed to slip into the background in the shadow of Churchill’s enormous fame, one of the most important being Field Marshal Sir John Dill, who became, most improbably, the essential, ever tactful and judicious link between the British chiefs of staff and government and FDR and Gen. Marshall—indeed the friendship that developed between Marshall and Dill was one of the “secret weapons” that led to Allied victory.

This is a great story, wonderfully told, impeccable history, but history with feeling, humanity, and a sense of the absurd, that never skips the engaging moment, the human failing (wait until you read about U.S. Admiral Stark), the moments of decency that make Allied policymaking so very different from that of Nazi Germany, and even the moments of humor particularly where Churchill is concerned.

It is usual in reviewing a long work of history for the reviewer to nitpick for small errors, but I can find none here (except for a photograph in which General Patton, clearly wearing the 1st Armored flash on his sleeve and his neatly brushed long silver hair under his forage cap is misidentified as General Eisenhower). Instead, I should add that the maps are superb and very clear, a useful addition to the book, instead of simply confusing the lay (i.e. non-military) reader, as is usually the case. This is a book that should have been read by the “Bush team,” for it shows, very convincingly, how decent, honorable men arguing their case, yet willing to listen to those who don’t agree with them, and even willing to change their mind and abandon a preconception, can win a war—the biggest of all wars, in fact. It is a book to put beside Doris Kearns Goodwin’s Team of Rivals as a model of how a democracy can win a war without losing its decency, and how people in positions of power and responsibility can disagree sharply without losing their respect for each other.

One hopes that President Obama will put it on his reading list. But I feel sure it is already there.

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New York Times bestselling author Michael Korda's books include Ike, Horse People, Country Matters, Ulysses S. Grant, and Charmed Lives.