What the Soldiers Need

Joe Raedle / Getty Images With Obama’s final decision on a troop surge in Afghanistan looming, Bush security adviser Frances Townsend argues that a lack of civilian support for the military may be our Achilles’ heel.

How do we best meet our national security objectives in Afghanistan?

In General McChrystal’s assessment, Afghanistan requires an “integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency campaign.” The general put the request for civilians ahead of the military because it is the most difficult to provide. It is there first because what civilian capacity the U.S. government has to deploy is weak, insufficient to the task, and not deployable in the way it’s required in Afghanistan. We do not have the civilian capacity today and we do not have a good, resourced plan to build it.

Today, our government lacks the civilian capacity to carry out the strategy General McChrystal recommended.

Al Qaeda and its allies in Afghanistan understand our need for civilian support, which explains why they attacked and killed six U.N. workers in Kabul in October. As a result, the UN pulled out 600 of its 1,100 staff. The UN withdrawal is a win for our enemies and will only serve to further embolden and encourage them.

Today, our government lacks the civilian capacity to carry out the strategy General McChrystal recommended. There is no one senior civilian coordinator in Afghanistan equivalent to Gen. McChrystal for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). No one has been nominated to head USAID, the civilian agency for international development. The lack of leadership both in Afghanistan and Washington at these critical posts cripples our efforts. In addition, U.S. foreign aid efforts are not tied to the support and achievement of our national security objectives. Consequently, such resource requests are viewed skeptically at best and subject to deep budget cuts at worst, especially in times of economic crisis. Furthermore, the newly created State Department Office of Civilian Reconstruction is insufficiently funded and therefore unable to build a capability that can be used effectively any time soon.

While the Obama administration has increased the number of U.S. civilians deployed to provide civilian support in Afghanistan to several hundred and has committed to doubling that number next year it still will not be enough. Furthermore, participation of Afghan civilians is also lacking. Our civilian support effort must help create an Afghan economy that the people of Afghanistan participate in, benefit from and have a stake in protecting. But today, few Afghan civilians are participating in the rebuilding effort. While widespread illiteracy will remain a challenge, we need to vet, hire and train more Afghan civilians to work with us.

On the international side, NATO’s contributions are more promising—though Americans are reluctant to acknowledge them. Certainly, we want NATO nations to increase their troop commitment; Al Qaeda and their Taliban supporters pose an equal threat to the safety and security of Europe as they do to the United States. But when we seek additional military and civilian support from NATO, we must recognize that the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Estonia send more troops to Afghanistan as a percentage of their total population than the United States. This is especially poignant when examining casualties. The U.S. ranks 7th in casualties as a percent of our country’s total population. In order to increase NATO contributions we must honor and recognize their current commitment and their tragic loss. We must demonstrate that we value their loss just as we do our own if we are to expect their willingness to increase their commitment.

Without adequate civilian capacity in Afghanistan -- U.S., European, and Afghan – the burden is borne time and again by our men and women in uniform. Today, the Fourth brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division is deployed to Afghanistan to do training. Certainly, the U.S. military is competent, capable and well equipped to provide military training. However, it should not be their job to build schools, roads, political parties and medical clinics.

In the end, the media follows the debate about troop levels because it is easy to understand, explain and follow. Men and women in uniform are easy to count, but they are difficult to lose and what they need to be successful is hard to provide. Gen. McChrystal’s assessment puts it bluntly: “ISAF cannot succeed without a corresponding cadre of civilian experts to support the change in strategy and capitalize on the expansion and acceleration of counterinsurgency efforts…the level of civilian resources must be balanced with the security forces, lest the gains in security outpace civilian capacity for governance and economic improvements.”