Lessons of History

If anyone has a unique insight into Iran’s nuclear program, it’s F. W. de Klerk. When South Africa’s last apartheid president took office in 1989, he also took control of the country’s six clandestinely built atomic bombs. Four years later, he confirmed to the world that his white minority government had indeed defied sanctions and become a nuclear power—and that he would be the first leader ever to destroy all of those weapons voluntarily.

Historical parallels, of course, seldom offer perfect symmetry. But during a week in which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s grandstanding letter to President George W. Bush offered some rare insights into the thoughts of the Iranian president, the similarities between Afrikaner-ruled Pretoria and mullah-led Tehran are worth examining. Like Pretoria’s former leaders, Iran’s theocrats feels themselves beleaguered and have convinced even citizens with little love for Ahmadinejad that the ability to enrich uranium—regardless of whether it will be used for nuclear power or to launch a weapons program Tehran claims not to want— is a matter of national pride .

Some commentators have also noted the religious rhetoric employed in both nations. “Intriguingly (and worryingly) present in both cases is an element of apocalyptic messianism,” wrote nuclear analysts Terence McNamee and Greg Mills in a recent op-ed column syndicated in South African newspapers. “Just as apartheid leaders employed biblical and apocalyptic imagery to describe potential threats to their regime—a world of good and evil, chosen people and heathens, redemption and fall—Iran’s new president delights in a Manichean rhetoric—a battle against an evil West that seeks to impose ‘the logic of the dark ages’ and divide the world into ‘light and dark countries’.” The former president, who shared the Nobel Peace Prize with Nelson Mandela in 1993, agrees that there are “some comparable circumstances.” Nukes, or the threat of them, “keep the world guessing,” says De Klerk. “In that sense, they are both a powerful weapon and a formidable tool.”

De Klerk’s measured style has changed little since the ebullient days of 1990, when he broke through South Africa’s political logjam by releasing Mandela from prison, lifting a 30-year ban on the African National Congress and paving the way for the negotiations that would eventually give black citizens the right to vote. In New York this month to promote his nonprofit Global Leadership Foundation—a group of former political leaders who offer confidential advice on governance to troubled governments—the 70-year-old De Klerk spoke to NEWSWEEK’s Arlene Getz at his midtown Manhattan hotel. Excerpts:

NEWSWEEK: What’s your view of Iran’s nuclear program?

F. W. de Klerk: As I understand it, there’s no allegation that Iran actually has nuclear weapons at the moment. The whole debate is about Iran enriching uranium, and [the] suspicion that they’re moving toward a [nuclear] capability and maybe actually moving toward manufacturing nuclear weapons. This differs from the situation in South Africa when I became president [in 1989]. We had six nuclear bombs already on the shelf, and the seventh was near to completion. In our case, I had to decide, do I keep them, or do I cancel the program? Our decision to cancel was a unilateral decision. We didn’t use it any way whatsoever as a negotiation tool.

You’re in the unique position of being the only leader ever to have dismantled nuclear bombs. What did that feel like?

I wasn’t part of the inner circle that developed [the program]. It was not my decision to build [the bomb], and I did not have the power to stop it. I was never enthusiastic about it. But as it was explained [to me] then, it was built never to be used, but to have it as a deterrent—to almost be used as a shield. It was built in the face of a definite threat, a definite strategy by the U.S.S.R., to directly or indirectly gain control of the whole of southern Africa … When I became president this threat changed in the sense that the Berlin Wall came down. Suddenly the U.S.S.R. was no longer this world power ... Some people accuse me of doing it [because] I realized that our constitutional negotiations would lead to a [Mandela-led] African National Congress government and [that] I was not prepared to let them control such a weapon. It’s not true.

What was your motivation?

First of all, the threat had changed, we didn’t need [the bomb], it had become a millstone around our neck. [Also,] I wanted South Africa to return as soon as possible to the international arena, and I wanted to convince the rest of the world that we really were not playing with words, we really were prepared to undertake negotiations which would result in fundamental change. I wanted to achieve international support for the change process in South Africa, and I wanted to ensure that the leading countries of the world would keep an eye over the negotiation process and that if [there were] a threat of the negotiations deteriorating into further conflict, then they would step in to assure that a negotiated solution is guaranteed.

Do you think Iran also wants nuclear capability—or at least the possibility of it—to serve as a deterrent to its opponents?

As an objective observer, one could identify some comparable circumstances [with South Africa]. I remember our former foreign minister, Pik Botha, always taking the attitude that he used [speculation about whether we had the bomb] to keep the world guessing. It is a powerful weapon, and in that sense [it also helps] to keep the channels of communication open.

Based on your own experience, should the world adopt a carrot or a stick approach to Tehran?

We did it because of the stick. Our oil from coal [program], our manufacturing of artificial rubber, our enrichment of uranium, which ended up with the building of the bombs—everything was as a result of growing isolation from the rest of the world. I’m not a believer in sanctions [which were imposed against South Africa] as being a very successful method of exercising pressure. My viewpoint about the value of sanctions and international isolation is that they should be reserved for very serious situations, and if that doesn’t work in 18 months or two years, then it should be accepted that as a strategy it has failed to achieve its objectives. I believe in engagement, and I believe in negotiation.

What does that mean for Iran?

I’m not saying that the countries that are justifiably so upset about what is happening in Iran should bend over backwards and allow Iran to dictate the agenda. I believe they have to be tough in setting reasonable preconditions for negotiations. But if those preconditions are reasonable and are not accepted by Iran, then there’s a moral and international legal basis for acting very firmly.

What would you consider reasonable preconditions?

In the face of Iran’s denial of what they are being accused of, absolute total opening of their facilities for regular inspections would for me be the foundation of creating an atmosphere for effective negotiations.

Do you have any sense that the Bush administration is considering military action against Iran?

I’m not near enough to the center of political opinion in the [United] States to give an authoritative opinion about that. I would say that with the situation in Iraq being what it is, and with the credibility of the present administration at stake with regard to its original motivation for going into Iraq, America should be extremely careful and—this is my personal opinion—refrain from considering that.

What do you think of Washington’s handling of postwar Iraq?

Some serious mistakes were made in the aftermath of the invasion ... But everybody was predicting that South Africa was on the verge of a catastrophe, and I think that you can, even at the very last moment, through creative thinking, through bold initiatives, rescue a very bad situation.

How do you feel about China’s increasing involvement in Africa?

I’m a bit cynical about it. I don’t think there’s anything wrong in an oil-hungry country focusing on good relations and getting a foothold in countries which can provide oil. But I don’t think China is the only oil-hungry country in the world. Africa has something to offer in the sense of oil, but oil will not save Africa. [The continent] needs to be offered an opportunity to work itself out of its destitution. The crucial factor in this regard lies in agriculture. The European Union and the U.S.A. need to stop paying lip service to phasing out unacceptable subsidies to their farmers and should take fairly radical steps to open up their markets for African [produce].

Just this week you were the target of some critical press in South Africa with one commentary accusing you of “distortion and double talk” about human rights abuses during apartheid.

There’s nothing new about this. All this was very much in the news at the time of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. What people need to remember are the facts [about death squads] that are now being regurgitated. These facts came out as a result of steps that I had taken. I appointed [the panels] that investigated them. I have taken every reasonable step to stamp out activities which were directly in opposition to my policy and goals.

You sound angry.

It’s not anger. I feel offended by this. I’m highly irritated by continuing efforts by what I’m convinced is a small element in South African society to unjustly and unfairly burden me with crimes which shock me as much as anyone else, and with regard to which I did more than anybody else to eradicate.

Is President Thabo Mbeki doing a good job of running South Africa?

If I were to draw a balance sheet, the positive by far outweighs the negative. The economy is very healthy. The commitment to upholding the constitution is admirable. The outstanding problems are tremendous, but I think we have the capacity, if we approach it the right way, to resolve them. Obviously, the single biggest problem is poverty. Hand in hand with this goes unemployment. And then the near pandemic of AIDS with which we are struggling—we need to control this, and we need to do much more than we are doing at the moment. The third big issue is the unacceptably high level of violent crime.

On a personal note, how do you want history to remember you?

I don’t think one should write one’s own epitaph. I hope that it will be said of me that I made a constructive contribution toward bringing peace and justice to all South Africans and toward preventing the death of hundreds of thousands of South Africans of all races and colors.