Talking Turkey

The Bush administration spent years trying to isolate people the Turkish government thought should be engaged—Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas, to name a few. The Obama administration broadly endorses engagement. Turkish-American relations are therefore about to change from being good despite fundamental disagreement to being a genuine meeting of minds. Some people in Washington have been screaming that Turkey's increasingly good relations with the countries in its neighborhood means it is "turning away from the West." Apparently they view international relations as a form of monogamy in which it's evidently dangerous to go out on a date. In fact, international relations are like business partnerships. An extensive Rolodex greatly increases a partner's value.

President Obama's visit this week to Turkey will also be unusual because, for once, America wants more from Turkey than Turkey wants from America. Turkey will respond generously because Barack Obama is likely to be around for a long time, and he will certainly remember anyone who helped make his first major foreign trip a success.

From Turkey's perspective, the most important item on the agenda is what it does not want: official U.S. recognition that what happened to the Armenians was genocide. I doubt Obama would have accepted an invitation to visit Turkey now if he was not planning to oppose a congressional resolution on the subject, or if he intended to use the G word on April 24, when he will make a statement commemorating the Armenian massacres of 1915. What this Turkish government will also ask for is unambiguous American backing for its plans to amend its present military-dictated Constitution along more democratic lines. They will not want to hear, once again, the Bush "we don't take sides" approach.

Heading up America's agenda are two items on which there is much common ground. First, Iran. Obama has indicated he wants to open wide-ranging negotiations, but he will not rush into them without first testing the waters. Similarly, Obama is serious about making progress on Mideast peace. Like Tony Blair and Tayyip Erdogan, Obama is thought to recognize that Hamas can no longer be ignored, though he cannot possibly say so publicly. Turkey's leaders (and their advisers) can provide Obama with valuable insights, and help start the ball rolling. This would allow Obama to avoid political exposure in Washington for "talking to terrorists" until he has a sense of the other side's position. Before setting anything in motion, though, he likely wants to take the measure of Prime Minister Erdogan and President Abdullah Gül personally. Both should remember that the role of matchmaker is transitory, and the principals must soon talk alone. In the long term, there is also the potential for friction because America is probably less willing to compromise than Turkey and may terminate discussions that Turkey would choose to keep going. Turkey, after all, will suffer much more than the United States if sanctions against Iran are ratcheted up.

Obama would also like to get more help on Afghanistan, principally more Turkish soldiers. This is a potential source of friction. Since Obama managed during his NATO meeting to pry commitments from France and Britain for a few hundred additional personnel, it will be hard for Turkey to do nothing.

Another item is Iraq. What needs to be agreed upon is already in place (except Turkey's relatively uncontroversial agreement that it will act as a corridor for U.S. withdrawal). Turkey will want intelligence sharing about the Kuridstan Worker's Party, or PKK, to continue, but there is no indication it will not. America will want Turkey's discussions with the Iraqi Kurds to continue. After Gül's successful Iraq visit, why wouldn't they? Both sides are hoping that Iraq will remain stable as the United States withdraws, but there are no major items either might agree to that it is not already doing.

Then there is Cyprus, but the real problem here is between Turkey and the European Union. Europe wants Turkey to open its ports and airports to the Greek Cypriots. Turkey wants Europe to ease the commercial isolation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in exchange, but the Greek Cypriots veto this. The United States can offer its support and its good offices, but it does not have much leverage over either the European Union or the Greek Cypriots. This is also broadly true of Turkey's EU entry negotiations.

A final item is the Nabucco pipeline bringing Central Asian gas to Europe via Turkey. Both America and Turkey would like to see it built. The question, however, is who will pay for it? Neither America nor Turkey has much spare cash right now.

And will Obama choose his Turkey visit to give a much anticipated speech of reconciliation to the world's Muslims? Of course not. Obama has to speak from the center of the Muslim World. Egypt must be the favorite, but a speech in Saudi Arabia would carry enormous symbolism, though I doubt the Saudis would go along. A good outside bet is Jordan. King Abdullah, remember, is a descendent of the Prophet—and a U.S. ally.