U.S. Expectations Modest for Pakistani Terror Crackdown

The U.S. government has been putting heavy pressure on Pakistan's military to wipe out Islamic insurgents in the border region of Waziristan since George W. Bush was president. But while the Obama administration is delighted that Pakistan's Army has finally launched a large-scale crackdown, expectations in Washington are modest as to what it will achieve.

Several current and former U.S. counterterrorism officials who have been following the operation's progress (and asked for anonymity when discussing sensitive information) said that among the least likely results they expect from the clearout is the capture or killing of Osama bin Laden and/or senior lieutenants like Ayman al-Zawahiri and Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, who some Western experts believe has now assumed the role of Al-Qaeda's "general manager." The officials said that Pakistani authorities have been preparing such an operation and signaling its likely commencement for so long that high-level Qaeda figures such as bin Laden, who at some point might have hidden in Waziristan, have had plenty of time to move well away from the area. U.S. officials say they would be shocked if anyone close to bin Laden's stature in Al Qaeda or the Taliban movement were swept up (or cut down) in the operation. The current sweep does not target other areas of Pakistan known in the past to have harbored top Qaeda fugitives, such as Karachi and Quetta. (Quetta is believed to be a major refuge for exiled leaders of the Afghan Taliban movement.)

Despite their low expectations, officials in Washington nonetheless say it is time that the Pakistanis moved ahead with the Waziristan crackdown, whose principal objective is to clear out—decimate if possible—tribal areas that have been used by Pakistan's native Taliban movement. There they have recruited and train new fighters and launched increasingly aggressive terrorist-style attacks on Pakistani government targets, such as a series of recent bombings and a hostage-taking at Pakistani Army headquarters in Rawalpindi. "Even if they don't manage to clear and hold [the border areas the Pakistani Army is sweeping], clearing the area is at least a start," said one American official. Others noted that in the two years that he has been the top U.S. military official, Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has visited Pakistan 13 times. Encouraging Pakistan to launch an operation like the current one has been a key element of his message.

Among the reasons American expectations are so low is that U.S. experts believe the Pakistani Army is not well equipped to conduct an effective clearout of a hostile and geographically challenging area like Waziristan. According to a former senior U.S. counterterrorism official, two specific disadvantages facing Pakistani forces are that it is too "road-bound" and too reliant on heavy artillery. Being road-bound means troops have to expose themselves to roadside assaults by irregular forces and IEDs; the Pakistanis simply don't have enough airlift capability—from helicopters—to circumvent these hazards. Heavy reliance on artillery means Army troops are not so exposed when they lob ordnance from a distance against Taliban targets, but they also face much greater risks of causing civilian casualties—which ultimately produce more recruits for the insurgency. Current and former U.S. officials say that while the U.S. has periodically offered Pakistani authorities access to advanced U.S. equipment, including helicopters and possibly drone aircraft, the Pakistanis have often turned such aid down because the Americans have demanded that the U.S. maintain some control over the equipment’s operations—a requirement that Pakistani officers regard as an infringement of their independence.