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As New York Anticipates Trying 9/11 Suspects, a New Report Condemns U.K. Prisons for Security Lapses

 

Two internationally prominent apostles of violent jihad, one of whom has been awaiting extradition to the U.S. for a decade, have been able to issue proclamations and exhortations supporting Al Qaeda even though they are locked up in one of Britain's most secure prisons, a new report by a British research group claims. The report raises questions about prison security for leading jihadists just as the U.S. Justice Department prepares to house Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other Al Qaeda operatives in a high-rise New York prison to await trial in Manhattan Federal Court for their role in the 9/11 attacks.

The Quilliam Foundation, a think tank set up by former members of Islamic extremist groups and financially supported by Britain's Home Office, alleges in a report published Monday that Adel Abdel Bary, a veteran leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad faction headed by Al Qaeda deputy chief Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Abu Qatada, a Jordanian cleric sometimes described as Osama bin Laden's ambassador in Europe, have been able to produce "pro-jihadist propaganda and fatwas" over the last two years even though they are locked up in Long Lartin, one of Britain's most formidable jails. The foundation's report also argues that British prisons remain a significant breeding ground for Islamic extremism and that measures the U.K. government has taken to curb jailhouse radicalization have been ineffective.

According to the report, last year, from inside Long Lartin, Abdel Bary, who has been held by British authorities on a U.S. extradition request since his indictment more than a decade ago as a co-conspirator in the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa, was able to issue an important fatwa, or religious declaration, defending Al Qaeda ideology against the criticisms of a more moderate cleric. The report claims that even though Abdel Bary's fatwa was translated by the BBC and sent to Britain's Foreign Office, there is no evidence the U.K. prison service, which is run by Britain's Justice Ministry, was ever alerted so that it could tighten security measures. (The Washington Post described how the U.K. government paid lawyers for Abdel Bary and two other Osama bin Laden associates indicted by the U.S. in connection with the 1998 embassy bombings nearly $1 million in fees in connection with their decade-long legal fight to avoid extradition to the same New York court that will now host the trials of 9/11 conspirators.)

Abu Qatada, whose assets were frozen by U.S. authorities shortly after 9/11 (but who is not subject to a U.S. extradition request), is widely believed to have been an inspiration and guru for Richard Reid, the 2001 would-be airline shoe bomber, and also for Zacarias Moussaoui, the convicted 9/11 co-conspirator who once attended the same mosque in south London that Reid attended. According to the Quilliam report, in June of last year, Abu Qatada gave an interview in Long Lartin prison to Abdel Bary, which then was transcribed, smuggled out, and disseminated around the world. The interview included various declarations of support for Al Qaeda, according to the Quilliam Foundation, and condemned Sunni sheikhs in Iraq who were cooperating with U.S. forces trying to fight jihadist forces. In January and March of this year, the report says, Abu Qatada managed to smuggle out two additional statements. "These incidents indicate there is clearly a major problem at Long Lartin," the report concludes.

The Quilliam report highlights and documents a long-standing concern on the part of both British and American authorities about how prisons in Britain have become major recruitment centers for radical Islam. The report cites several cases in which men who became involved in terrorist conspiracies that have been linked to Al Qaeda apparently acquired their radical views while serving time in British prisons. One of the most notorious cases is that of Reid, a petty criminal from south London who converted to Islam while in a juvenile detention center and in 2001 tried to blow up a U.S.-bound transatlantic airliner with a bomb concealed in his shoe. Another case cited in the report is that of Muktar Said Ibrahim, an Eritrean immigrant to Britain who reportedly became radicalized while doing time for gang-related offenses and subsequently became part of a suicide-bombing squad that unsuccessfully tried to attack the London public transportation system on July 21, 2005. (Two weeks earlier, another cell killed more than 50 people in four London suicide bombings of public transportation.)

Since 9/11, the December 2001 shoe-bombing incident involving Reid, and the 2005 London bombing attacks, authorities in Britain and the U.S. have recognized that jihadist recruiters have tapped into a well of deep resentment among alienated youth in some of Britain's more impoverished communities, particularly economically strained former industrial areas in London's poorer boroughs and in provincial cities such as Birmingham, Leeds, and Bradford. Frequently, suspects implicated in British-based terror plots have been British-born men either of Islamic family backgrounds or men like Reid, who first encountered Islamic radicalism behind bars.

Under U.S. visa rules for citizens of friendly countries, generally British passport holders have been able to enter the U.S. on tourist visas without extensive pre-travel security checks, a situation that has led some U.S. officials to express concern that Britain is one of the most dangerous staging areas for potential attacks on the U.S. mainland. The head of MI5, Britain's principal counterterrorism agency, was quoted earlier this year saying that at any one time his officers are trying to keep track of around 2,000 suspects; other U.K. sources say that authorities are monitoring a dozen or more active terror plots at once. U.K. officials have said that up to 400,000 people travel yearly between the United Kingdom and Pakistan, and that once travelers reach Pakistan, British authorities have little ability to track where they go or who they meet. Several major U.K. terror plots, including both the thwarted and the successful 2005 London transportation attacks and a 2006 plot to attack transatlantic airliners, were attributed to conspirators based in Britain who trained or had contact with suspected Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Quilliam report's point is that British prisons may be contributing to the problem of Islamic radicalization in Britain, rather than helping to curb it.

Other U.K. prisoners also wanted by, or well-known to, U.S. authorities are also mentioned in the Quilliam report. It notes that Abu Hamza, the notorious hook-handed imam from north London who is also the subject of a U.S. extradition request, last year was able to lead hunger strikes in Belmarsh, an ultra-high-security prison in southeast London, and that Hamza supposedly has been able to preach to other Muslim inmates through pipes that link their prison cells. The report alleges that in another British prison in 2007-2008, Dhiren Barot, an associate of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed who before 9/11 reportedly visited New York and Washington to "case" government and financial targets, was involved in a series of violent attacks on other prisoners that included "boiling oil being thrown over prisoners, stabbings, arson attacks and attempts to destroy prison facilities." The report alleges that a prisoner known as Abu Doha, who also is under U.S. indictment, was "given courses while held in Belmarsh which enabled him to become a 'listener,' a prisoner who officially mentors and gives advice to other prisoners." (A U.K. official said that Abu Doha has now been released on bail under strict conditions of house arrest; his extradition became problematic when a key U.S. witness against him stopped cooperating with authorities.)

One British official, who asked for anonymity in accordance with British government practice, criticized the Quilliam report's evidence as "slightly circumstantial" and said it contained inaccuracies. A spokesman for Britain's Prison Service, who also requested anonymity, issued this written response to the think-tank report:

"It is unfortunate that the Quilliam Foundation did not see fit to share their report with us, and that they did not apply to visit any prisons or speak to those who run them, in doing their research. However, we remain willing to consider practical ideas for dealing with the issues faced by the prison service.

"We are extremely skilled in managing all challenging and dangerous criminals, and adapting to evolving risks and dangers. We run a dedicated, expert unit which leads work to tackle the risk of extremism and radicalisation in prison. All our High Security prisons operate enhanced monitoring and intelligence-gathering on those convicted or suspected of involvement in terrorism or extremism. We work with closely with the Home Office, police and partner agencies. Staff are supported with the information and training they need to deal with these individuals."

 

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